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The thesis of this short paper is that skeptical theism does not look very plausi­
ble from the perspective of a common sense epistemology. A corollary of this is 
that anyone who finds common sense epistemology plausible and is attracted 
to skeptical theism has some work to do to show that they can form a plausible 
whole. The dialectical situation is that to the degree that this argument is a 
strong one, to that same degree (at least) the theorist who would like to com­
bine common sense epistemology with skeptical theism has some work to do.
The thesis of this short paper is that skeptical theism does not look very 
plausible from the perspective of a common sense epistemology. A corol­
lary of this is that anyone who finds common sense epistemology plausible 
and is attracted to skeptical theism has some work to do to show that they 
can form a plausible whole. The argument can be summarized as follows.
(1) If common sense epistemology is correct, then it is relatively easy 
to justifiedly believe that there exist instances of intense suffer­
ing which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented 
without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil 
equally bad or worse.
(2) If it is relatively easy to justifiedly believe that there exist instances 
of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could 
have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or per­
mitting some evil equally bad or worse., then skeptical theism is 
not a plausible response to the problem of evil.
(3) Therefore, if common sense epistemology is correct, then skeptical 
theism is not plausible.
This is not the place to defend the rectitude of common sense epistemol- 
ogy.1 Thus there is no premise here which asserts the antecedent of the 
first premise. The dialectical situation is that to the degree that this argu­
ment is a strong one, to that same degree (at least) the theorist who would 
like to combine common sense epistemology with skeptical theism has 
some work to do.2
I. What Is Skeptical Theism?
In short, skeptical theism is a response to the evidential problem of evil, 
most notably formulated by William Rowe thusly:3
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1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, om­
niscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some 
greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
2. An omnipotent, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence 
of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without 
thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally 
bad or worse.
3. There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.
Skeptical theists in one way or another reply that the only evidence for 1 
is that there are instances of intense suffering for which we cannot think 
of some greater good which would have been lost if it were prevented 
or some evil equally bad or worse which would have resulted if it were 
prevented, and that furthermore we have no reason to suppose that we 
would be able to think of such if it existed.
II. What Is Common Sense Epistemology?
This is not the place for a thorough exposition of common sense epis­
temology, but I can give a sufficient amount of detail in a short space. 
Though Socrates may not approve, I will begin with some examples. The 
natural place to start is with Moore.4 Moore's famous argument refutes the 
skeptic thus: "See, look there, I have hands, thus I'm not a handless brain 
in a vat." Moore never built much explicit epistemological theory upon 
this terse contestation, but one way to understand it is that the common 
sense beliefs—like the one about hands—have more going for them than 
any skeptical scenario. This is especially so in the case of skeptical argu­
ments which strike many as mere sophistry and, at any rate, are rather 
complicated and arcane. Thus one is justified in holding on to beliefs that 
seem to just stare you in the face until there is some overwhelming reason 
to doubt them.5
Another form of common sense epistemology is represented by 
Chisholm.6 According to Chisholm there are basic epistemic principles 
which link our appearance states to justified beliefs having the same 
content as those appearance states. James Pryor has recently taken up 
the defense of essentially this view.7 Chisholm offers multiple epistemic 
principles for various basic sources of justification, but some common 
sense epistemologists offer single simple principles to do what Chisholm 
does with many. Such a principle can be gleaned from Pryor. I will call it 
the Principle of Immediate Justification.
(PIJ) [W]henever you have an experience as of p, you thereby have im­
mediate prima facie justification for believing p.8
Two more examples are Michael Huemer and Richard Swinburne. Huemer 
calls his principle the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism.9
(PC) If it seems to S as if P, then S thereby has at least prima facie jus­
tification for believing that P.
Swinburne calls his principle the Principle of Credulity. Swinburne:
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This principle claims that every proposition that a subject believes 
or is inclined to believe has (in so far as it is basic) in his noetic 
structure a probability corresponding to the strength of the belief or 
semi-belief or inclination to believe. Understanding 'seems' in the 
epistemic sense . . . then put more aphoristically, the principle says: 
things are probably as they seem to be.10
What all these views have in common is that experiences, inclinations to 
believe, appearance states and the like are sufficient to justify the beliefs 
they give rise to. Since epistemic seemings seem to cover all these cases 
I will use Huemer's principle (PC) in what follows, though I don't think 
anything rides on that choice. I think basic idea of common sense episte­
mology is sufficiently clear and (PC) sufficiently broad to cover most if not 
all admissible precisifications.
III. Why Does Common Sense Epistemology Threaten Skeptical Theism?
Given a common sense epistemology, if it seems to someone that for some 
given instance of evil that it is a witness for the first premise of Rowe's ar­
gument, i.e., a witness that there exist instances of intense suffering which 
an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby 
losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse, 
then that person is justified in that belief. And the stronger that impres­
sion, the more firmly in place that justification will be. To dislodge the 
justification will require considerations which create a stronger impres­
sion to the contrary or bring it about that the impression is lessened, so 
that it no longer seems to the individual in question that there couldn't be 
a reason for the evil.
And it is not just that there are some evils such that it is not the case that 
any suggested justification seems viable. Rather, what many people claim 
to experience is that it seems to them that it is not the case that, possibly, 
there is a justification for this evil. It is a distinctively modal intuition. Some 
eschew modal intuitions,11 but this wipes out much knowledge. We can 
see that there couldn't possibly be a counter-example to Modus Ponens.12 
At any rate, most common sense epistemologists—all the ones mentioned 
above—allow that modal intuitions justify modal claims. So there is no 
confusion here between absence of evidence and evidence of absence. If 
common sense epistemology is correct then we do have evidence of ab­
sence: the strong intuition concerning some evils that there could not pos­
sibly be anything to justify this.
Now consider the central claims of skeptical theism. Derk Pereboom 
has recently done an excellent job of summing up the main thrust of skep­
tical theism.13
Skeptical theism claims that because of the limitations of our cogni­
tive capacities, the nature of the good is or might well be beyond 
our understanding to such a degree that we should not expect to 
understand how it is that God's governance of the universe accords 
with divine goodness.14
EPISTEMOLOGY AND SKEPTICAL THEISM 175
Paul Draper boils the thesis down to a succinct principle.
ST1: Humans are in no position to judge directly that an omnipotent 
and omniscient being would be unlikely to have a morally suf­
ficient reason to permit the evils we find in the world.15
Notice, though, that for the skeptical theist to provide a defeater for our 
hypothetical individual the skeptical theist's considerations will have to 
wipe away the initial appearance of gratuity or else those considerations 
will have to have to generate a stronger appearance of truth. It's hard to 
see how there could be any general considerations that could do that. For 
those for whom horrendous evils appear obviously gratuitous, it is highly 
unlikely that reminding them that they are finite and fallible is going to 
erase the strong impression, horror even, at apparently gratuitous evils. 
Again, the kind of instance of evil which are at the center of the Problem of 
Evil—apparently gratuitous horrendous evils—create very strong impres­
sions. It is therefore going to be easy for someone who honestly considers 
ST1 to nevertheless reasonably fail to have an undercutting defeater. Don't 
get me wrong: ST1 is quite plausible. And it might even reduce the extent 
of our confidence in the negative intuition. But it is thereby damned with 
faint praise, for the sense that there are horrendous gratuitous evils is, for 
many of us, overwhelming. Thus it does not fully defeat the initial prima fa­
cie justification and we remain justified in taking evil as evidence against 
the existence of God.
As one who thinks there is something clearly right in skeptical theism, 
but who is committed to common sense epistemology (and occasionally 
has a strong sense that certain evils defy all possible justification) I am 
very interested in further research which might show that the two theses 
are better bedfellows than they appear to me to be.
University of Rochester
NOTES
1. The current main alternatives—skepticism, contextualism, relativ­
ism—are not very attractive to say the least. Contexualism has become some­
what popular. For a very recent exposition and critique, see Richard Feldman, 
“Contextualism," in The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 2nd edition, ed. 
Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008).
2. I wish to emphasize that the argument I will take up is not a reductio. 
That is, I will not argue from the denial of the consequent of (3) to the denial 
of the antecedent of (1) and conclude that since the plausibility of skepticism 
entails the incorrectness of common sense epistemology it thereby ought to 
be rejected because of its dire epistemological consequences. That is another 
argument entirely and I will not treat it in any way below. For moral versions 
of such an argument see Bruce Russell, “Defenseless," in The Evidential Argu­
ment from Evil, ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1996), pp. 193-205 and, more recently and more thoroughly, William 
Hasker, Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God (Abbington, UK: Routledge, 
2004), chap. 3 “The sceptical solution to the problem of evil."
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3. I quote from The Evidential Argument from Evil. The article originally 
appeared in the American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979).
4. See “A Proof of the External World," 1939 reprinted in Sosa and Kim, 
Epistemology: An Anthology (Blackwell, 2000), chap. 2. See also “A Defense of 
Common Sense," Contemporary British Philosophy (2nd series), ed. J. H. Muirhead, 
1925. Reprinted in G. E. Moore, Philosophical Papers (1959).
5. in a related article Klaas J. Kraay gives short shrift to the justification 
conferred by commonsense epistemology saying “I suspect that defenders of 
Rowe would prefer stronger support (than that which may be conferred by 
the Principle of Credulity)." “Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence," 
Faith and Philosophy 24 (2007): pp. 202-27. However, if common sense episte­
mology is correct then—though everyone no doubt wants as much support as 
they can have for their beliefs—the proponent of Rowe's argument has ade­
quate support for reasonable belief and thus is not to be dismissed so lightly.
6. See Theory of Knowledge, 3rd edition. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice 
Hall, 1989).
7. James Pryor, “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist," Nous, 34 (2000), pp. 
517-49.
8. Ibid., p. 536.
9. Michael Huemer, Skepticism and the Veil o f Perception (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), p. 99.
10. Richard Swinburne, Epistemic Justification (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), p. 142. Swinburne also defends the principle in his Providence 
and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 20-22 and 
then—pp. 22-23—goes on to suggest just the line of thought pursued here: that 
the principle licenses an inference to the truth of Premise 1 of Rowe's argument. 
This is my application of what Swinburne says. He makes no mention of Rowe 
and the evidential argument he considers (p. 13) is very different from Rowe's. 
Rowe himself realizes that he needs some kind of principle of credulity. See his 
“Religious Experience and the Principle of Credulity" International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion, vol. 13 (1982), and then again very briefly in “The Empiri­
cal Argument from Evil" in Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment, 
ed. Robert Audi and William J. Wainwright (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1986), pp. 227-47, esp. p. 244.
11. Peter van Inwagen stands out. See his Ontology, Identity, and Modality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), chap. 13 for example.
12. Van McGee's “A Counter-example to Modus Ponens" notwithstanding, 
Journal of Philosophy (September 1985), 82 (9): pp. 462-71. And I don't think it 
is the case that we infer this from seeing its necessary truth. In fact, I think in 
most cases of modal intuition it works the reverse. That is, we see from the 
apparent absence of counter-example, that it must be a necessary truth. In 
mathematics this is often the only evidence available.
13. Plausibly, Stephen Wykstra was the first to bring this kind of argument 
to the attention of analytic philosophers with his “The Human Obstacle to 
Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of 'Appearance," 
International Journal for Philosohy of Religion 16 (1984): pp. 73-94.
14. Derk Pereboom, “Free Will, Evil, and Divine Providence," in Andrew 
Chignell, God and the Ethics of Belief (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), p. 88.
15. Paul Draper, “The Skeptical Theist," in The Evidential Argument from 
Evil, p. 176. In these two summaries I am avoiding explicitly probabilistic 
formulations of the issue for the sake of simplicity. Nothing rests on this 
ultimately.
